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LESLIE M. ROSE
U.S. BOMBING OF
AFGHANISTAN NOT JUSTIFIED
AS SELF-DEFENSE UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
[T]he right ofself-defence "exists within and not outside
or above the law. "1
Introduction
On October 7,2001, the United States began its bombing campaign
in Afghanistan. That same day, the United States representative to the United
Nations, John Negroponte, informed the Security Council that the U.S. was
invoking article 51 of the UN Charter:
In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish, on
behalf of my Government, to report that the United States of America, to-
gether with other States, has initiated action in the exercise of its inherent
right of individual and collective self-defence following the armed attacks
that were carried out against the United States on 11 September 200}.2
Thus the U.S. set forth its formal justification for the massive bombing
of Afghanistan as legally supportable self-defense under international law.
But was it? This article will explore the meaning of "self-defense" and
how it should be applied to the actions in Afghanistan.
The Caroline case has been recognized by scholars as stating the modem
rule of customary international law on self-defense.3 The case arose in 1837,
when the British suspected that the Caroline, an American ship docked in
New York, was transporting arms to Canadian rebels. On British orders,
The Caroline was boarded and destroyed, and two men were killed. The
British ambassador to the U.S. justified the attack on the ground of self-
defense. U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster responded that self-defense
justifies an attack only when the "necessity of that self-defense is instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for delib-
eration." 4
The U.S. bombing of Afghanistan does not meet this standard. The need
for defense was not instant; indeed the bombing did not begin until three
weeks after September II-leaving more than a moment for deliberation.
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As many have argued, there was a choice of means-in particular, the resort
to international criminal process and investigation, as well as peaceful nego-
tiation for the surrender of those responsible.5
The Caroline rule was later incorporated into article 51 of the UN Char-
ter.6 Article 51 provides, in relevant part:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures neces-
sary to maintain international peace, and security.7
Any evaluation of the requirements of article 51 must be looked at in the
context of the prohibition on the use of force, embodied in article 2(4) of the
Charter.8 This part of the Charter has been described by the International
Law Commission as "a conspicuous example of a rule in international law
having the character of jus cogens"9-a view which has been accepted by
the U.S. IO Article 51 is an exception to the prohibition on the use of force.
Ultimately, if a state's use of force cannot be legally justified as self-defense,
then that state has violated the Charter. Article 2(4) must be seen as para-
mount. If the concept of self-defense is not carefully reigned in and if coun-
tries claiming to exercise it are not carefully scrutinized, then the exception
will usurp the rule.
In its 1986 judgment in Nicaragua v. United States, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) concluded that the U.s. had breached its obligation under cus-
tomary law not to use force against another state. II The court rejected the U.S.
claim of collective self-defense for, among other things, mining Nicaragua's
harbors and attacking its oil installations, 12 The decision includes an extensive
discussion of the law governing claims of self-defense. '
According to the ICJ, in order for the use of force in self-defense to be
lawful under international law, the defending state must be responding to an
armed attack. This response must also comply with the principles of neces-
sity and proportionality.13 The ongoing attacks on Afghanistan do not meet
this test.
Armed attack
Article 51 states explicitly that an armed attack is required before the
right of self-defense can be invoked. The ICJ has described this requirement
as the "condition sine qua non" of lawful self-defense. '4
In the Nicaragua case, the U.S. alleged that Nicaragua had supplied weap-
ons to rebel groups in other countries. The U.S. claimed that the acts of
which it was accused were justified by its right of collective self-defense
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against an armed attack by Nicaragua on El Salvador, Honduras or Costa
Rica. ls The ICJ found that an armed attack was not established by the provi-
sion of arms by one state to the opposition in another state, even though such
conduct might still be unlawful. 16
In the case of the bombing of Afghanistan, the analysis is complicated
because a non-state actor initiated the attack. Therefore, we must examine
what level of assistance must be given by a state in order for the armed
attack to be imputed to the state.
According to both the ICJ and the'Intemational Law Commission, "the
right of self-defense does not apply with full force" in cases involving ter-
rorists operating from a third country. 17 Moreover,
[a]s with the case of attacks against nationals abroad, there is a risk in
broadening the right of self-defense to justify the use of force against non-
state-sponsored terrorism. Toleration of such action increases the potential
for abuse of the right of self-defense and for the indiscriminate violation of
state sover~ignty. 18 •
As intemationallaw professor and current ICJ member Rosalyn Higgins
has pointed out, states sometimes assert self-defense in cases "that really
. bear the characteristics of reprisals or retaliation,"19 which are not permitted
under the U.N. Charter. For example, the U.S. described its 1986 bombing
of Libya, in response to perceived terrorism against nationals, as
designed to 'disrupt Libya's abilitY' to carry out terrorist acts and to deter
future terrorist acts by Libya.' The former is the language of retaliation, the
latter of reprisals. Neither is really the language of self-defence.2o
When one examines the meager evidence publicly available on October
7, it is difficult to conclude that the attacks of September 11 qualify as "armed
attacks" by the' state of Afghanistan. Indeed, the statements made by U.S.
officials at the start of the military campaign are insufficient to support a
claim of self-defense. For example, in his letter to the Security Council,
John Negroponte wrote:
Since II September, my'Government has obtained clear and compelling
information that the Al-Qaeda organization, which is supported by the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in the attacks. There is
still much we do not know. Our inquiry is in its early stages. We may find
that our self-defence requires further actions with respect to other organi-
zations and other States.21
Negroponte stated further that AI-Qaeda posed an "ongoing threat" to
the U.S. that had been "made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime
to allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by this organiza-
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tion as a base of operation." The U.S. had, therefore, mobilized armed forces
to "prevent and deter" additional attacks.22 It is doubtful that Rosalyn Higgins
would describe this as the language of self-defense.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld used similar language, stat-
ing that terrorists had "chosen Afghanistan from which to organize their
activities," that the Taliban "continues to tolerate" their presence, and that
"harboring terrorists is unacceptable and carries a price."23 The Security
Council has condemned the Taliban "for allowing Afghanistan to be used as
a base for the export of terrorism by the AI-Qaeda network" and "for provid-
ing safe haven" to Osama bin Laden.24 None of these statements describe
sufficient involvement by the state of Afghanistan to hold it responsible for
an armed attack under the law governing self-defense.
Furthermore, as Professor Thomas Franck recently noted, "any prin-
cipled decision" that a clear state-to-state attack has occurred must be based
on "a credible assessment of the facts" of the particular case.25 What "facts"
were provided on October 7? At the time the bombing started, there was no
evidence presented, although there was apparently secret evidence shared
with certain allies. Indeed, Negroponte admits that the U.S. did not have a
great deal of information. The U.S. government refused to share any evi-
dence it did have with the public, the press, or the government of Afghani-
stan, despite requests to do so.
Even if, for the purpose of argument, the September 11 attack could be
construed to be an armed attack by the state of Afghanistan, the subsequent
bombing by the U.S. would still have to meet the tests of necessity and pro-
portionality in order to qualify as self-defense under international law.
Necessity and proportionality
The large number of Afghan civilian deaths, which now exceeds the num-
ber of deaths caused by the September 11 attack, the destruction of
Afghanistan's infrastructure, the exacerbation of the refugee crisis, and the
exacerbation of the unexploded ordnance problem go well beyond what may
be considered necessary and proportional.
The Ie] has emphasized, more than once, that under customary interna-
tionallaw a claim of self-defense must meet the requirements of necessity
and proportionality. Indeed, in the Nicaragua case, the U.S. agreed "that
whether the response to the attack is lawful depends on observance of the
criteria of the necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in
self-defence."26
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Some scholars have suggested that when a non-state actor is involved,
"the victim state should have to meet a heavier burden of necessity and pro-
portionality than when the initial attack was state-sponsored," even when
the third party state has been shown to support the initial attack.27
Necessity
When, as here, the armed attack has ended, the state relying on self-
defense "has a heavy burden" to show that its response was necessary and
that it does not "amount to retaliation."28 According to Maureen Brennan,
The requirement of necessity provides that the use of force must be the only
available means of self-defense and no other peaceful means of redress would
be effective. Oscar Schachter, a distinguished international law professor
and advisor in the preparation of the Restatement, distinguishes between cases
where an armed attack is occurring, and those where an armed attack has
already occurred, but additional attacks are expected. In the former case, the
use of force always meets the requirement of necessity, but in the latter case
the issue is not as clear. However, as an example of when preemptive self-
defenseis valid, ,Schachter proposes the case of an armed action to rescue
hostages, where captured persons are in imminent danger. 29
The time between the armed attack and the response is a relevant consid-
eration. For example, in 1993, the U.S. launched missile strikes on Baghdad
two months after an assassination attempt on President George H. W. Bush.
Many in the international community complained that the strikes were not
necessary and proportional because of the delay and because the strikes did
nothing to prevent an armed attack.30
The U.S. bombing of Afghanistan was of questionable necessity. The
attack of September 11 was over three weeks before the U.S. military strikes
began. While the U.S. feared further attacks, they were not imminent. The
threats were vague and the bombing was not specifically targeted at the source
of the threat. Thus the ongoing bombing campaign appears to be closer to
retaliation than self-defense.
Proportionality
Now, the word "proportion"-"proportionate"-is interesting. And Idon't know
that it's appropriate. And I don't know that I could define it.... It's a-your
question's too tough for me. I don't know what "proportionate" would be....
Ijust don't know. I mean, you simply can't have outside inquiries on every
single thing that goes on in the world.... I mean, this is a messy place.
There's a war going on.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, November 30,2001 31
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The principle of proportionality is measured by evaluating the military
importance of a particular operation compared to the impacts on civilians
and civilian objects. Thus it is important to identify which objects of attack
are legitimate: "If there is any doubt whether an object normally devoted to
civilian use, such as a church, school or museum, is being used for its proper
purpose or being put to military use, they must be given the benefit of the
doubt and not subjected to attack."32
When force is used in self-defense, it must be proportionate to the force
defended against; it cannot be excessive. Military strikes that indiscrimi-
nately target civilians are an example of excessive force. 33
The numerous reports of civilian deaths and damage to civilian infra-
structure in Afghanistan demonstrate that the force used by the U.S. is ex-
cessive and does not meet the requirement of proportionality.34 For example,
just four days after the U.S. began bombing, Reuters reported that 76 civil-
ians had already been killed and 100 injured.3s By October 30 there was no
electricity and no running water in Kandahar.36 Twice U.S. bombs hit clearly
marked facilities of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which
contained humanitarian supplies. Several world leaders have criticized the
high rate of civilian casualtiesY
Professor Marc Herold, an economist at the University of New Hamp-
shire, has released a well-documented report indicating that the U.S. bomb-
ing campaign killed 3,767 civilians between October 7 and December 10.
This figure, which exceeds the latest death toll from September 11, does not
include deaths caused by landmines, starvation, or disease. Herold gathered
the information from numerous sources, including the mainstream press in
Europe and first-hand accounts.38
Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the lack of proportionality in the
U.S. military campaign can be found by looking at the nature of the weapons
being used.
The use by the U.S Air Force of weapons of enormous destructive capabil-
ity-including fuel air bombs, B-52 carpet bombing, BLU-82s, and CBU-87
cluster bombs [shown to be so effective at killing and maiming civilians who
happen to come upon the unexploded 'bomblets']-reveals the emptiness in
the claim that the U.S has been trying to avoid Afghan civilian casualties.39
Cluster bombs are particularly devastating. Each one breaks up into more
than 200 "bomblets" which are designed to detonate when they hit the ground,
but which often do not. They remain buried, "as deadly as unexploded mines,"
and are sometimes mistaken for humanitarian food packages. Several hun-
dred of these weapons have rained down on the population of Afghanistan
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since the U.S. began using them in October.40 Amnesty International has
asked the U.S. to stop using cluster bombs as they "present a high risk of
violating the prohibition of indiscriminate attack."41
The military campaign also interfered with the delivery of much needed
food supplies to civilians already at risk of starvation and has caused a mas-
sive refugee crisis. In early December, the Office of the UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees reported that the usual daily number of refugees fleeing
southern Afghanistan had risen from 400 to 1200.42 Afghan widows in Kabul
have reported that the meager humanitarian aid that they had been receiving
suddenly stopped at the end of November.43
In addition, the country's infrastructure has been targeted:
On October 15th, U.S bombs destroyed Kabul's main telephone exchange,
killing 12. In late October, U.S warplanes bombed the electrical grid in
Kandahar knocking out all power, but the Taliban were able to divert some
electricity to the city from a generating plant in another province, Helmand,
but that generation plant [at Kajakai dam] was then bombed. On October
31st, it launched seven air strikes against Afghanistan's largest hydro-elec-
tric power station adjacent to the huge Kajakai dam, 90 kilometers north-
west of Kandahar, raising fears about the dam breaking. On November
12th, a guided bomb scored a direct hit on the Kabul office of the Al Jazeera
news agency, which had been reporting from Afghanistan in a manner
deemed hostile by Washington. On November 18th, U.S warplanes bombed
religious schools [Madrasas] in the Khost and Shamshad areas.44
As of January 4,2002, U.S. bombs continued to kill Afghan civilians,45
even though the Taliban government has been ousted and the whereabouts
of Osama bin-Laden are unknown.46 This military campaign was not pro-
portionate under internationallaw.47
Conclusion
The United States military strikes against Afghanistan cannot be justi-
fied as self-defense under the United Nations Charter or customary interna-
tionallaw. There is insufficient evidence of an armed attack by the state of
Afghanistan and the strikes have been neither necessary nor proportional.
Some commentators have raised the issue of the ineffectiveness of ar-
ticle 51 to deal with the present day realities of armed conflict and the uncer-
tainties of terrorism, arguing that the law should adapt and the concept of
self-defense be broadened to include the current U.S. campaign.48 In fact,
the realities of terrorism support the opposite conclusion. Less force is bet-
ter. If the current bombing can be justified as legitimate self-defense, we are
surely on a slippery slope that does not bode well for the rule of law or for
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the guiding principles of the UN Charter.
If self-defense justifies the actions of the U.S. and its allies, then when
does that justification end? Can a country say that the threat of terrorism is
ongoing and continue to bomb any country anywhere in the world where it
suspects that the state is "harboring" members of a terrorist organization?
What evidence, if any, will the defending country be required to produce?
U.S. officials have indicated that the next front in the war on terrorism could
include the Philippines, Somalia, Yemen, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.49 In-
deed, there are reports of AI-Quaeda related cells throughout Europe. Will
the U.S. be dropping cluster bombs there as well?
Even more disturbing is the possibility that the U.S. has set a new stan-
dard for combating terrorism that may be adopted by other countries-giv-
ing them "permission" to go after groups with military force rather than
negotiation or criminal process.so Former U.S. national security adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski recently warned that:
By declaring war against an undifferentiated, undefined and fundamentally
vague phenomenon like global terrorism, or terrorism with global reach, we
in a sense opened the gates to a lot of countries to leap into this exercise on
our backs. They are all declaring whoever their enemy is to be a terrorist, and
then claiming moral justification for doing whatever they decide to do.'1
No matter how ~orrible the events of September 11 and how real the
desire of the United States to protect its residents, seeking refuge in the
concept of self-defense is both misplaced and dangerous. The bombing of
Afghanistan is illegal and it will not make anyone safer.S2
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